The Extraterritorial Powers of Cities by Anderson, William
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1926
The Extraterritorial Powers of Cities
William Anderson
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Anderson, William, "The Extraterritorial Powers of Cities" (1926). Minnesota Law Review. 2516.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2516
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
THE EXTRATERRITORIAL POWERS OF CITIESt
By WILLIAM ANDERSON*
GOVERNMENTAL POWERSU P to this this point we have dealt primarily with powers of a
corporate or business character. We have left for discus-
'sion three powers of a distinctly governmental nature, which are
in a number of cases exercised by cities beyond their boundaries.
These powers-eminent domain, taxation, and police power-are
not ends in themselves but rather the means 'by which the purposes
of city government may be accomplished. Lurking in the back-
ground at all times, therefore, is the question of public purpose
or public use, a question which may be especially puzzling when
a city goes outside of its ordinary territorial limits to exercise its
supposed authority There is always, too, the question of the
power of one place to encroach upon the local self-governing
powers of a neighboring community
EMINENT DOMAIN
The eminent domain cases give us least trouble of all. If it be
once conceded that water supplies, parks, and similar facilities
are for public purposes, and even for municipal purposes although
located outside of city limits, then there can be little legal objec-
tion to the use 6f condemnation proceedings in the furtherance of
the public purpose. Private interests are, after all, fully pro-
tected in matters of procedure and by the guaranty of adequate
compensation, and the public interest completely outweighs all
other considerations. The water supply requirements of the na-
tional metropolis are so great and urgent that few would con-
tend that the power of eminent domain should not be used to ac-
complish the desired result. The magnitude of the undertaking
is impressed upon us, however, when we read that, by purchase
or condemnation, eleven towns have been taken over and their
lands incorporated into the water impounding area. 74
The right of the legislature to authorize cities to condemn lands
outside their boundaries for municipal purposes has apparently
not been seriously questioned.75 As a rule, however, the courts
"Continued from 10 MINNESOTA LAW Rmmv 497
*Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota.
74New York Times Magazine, Sept. 13. 1925.
75Qf course the usual question as to "public purpose" has arisen, and
sometimes the question of "city purpose." Typical cases in which the
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have not had to answer the question whether the power of con-
demnation could be implied, for legislatures have in most cases
been careful to. express the power. An Illinois decision is au-
thority *for the, ruling that where a city had statutory authority
"'to build, or acquire by purchase, lease or gift, and to maintain
ferries and bridges, and the approaches thereto" at any point
within.five miles of the city, and to construct roads leading there-
to, the power to condemn lands for these purposes would be im-
plied."8 To reach this conclusion the court had to hold that the
act clearly indicated a purpose to have such ferries established,
that "a thing-within the intention of the statute is as much within
the statute as if it were within the letter," and that, therefore, the
doctrine of expressio unius would not apply. To the writer this
reasoning, appears to be somewhat strained, but it is hard to see
how such taxation could not be equal or uniform. In Iowa, as we
a liberal attitude toward municipalities in such matters.
TAXATION
The taxation cases present more difficulties, and can be dealt
with adequately only after they have been properly classified. In
the first group fall the taxes levied upon railroads, express com-
panies; and other interstate carriers. Such taxes are usually levied
locally, in the form of license or occupational taxes, upon the
right to do business or to maintain terminals or offices in the city.
In their effects, however, such taxes may operate extra-territorial-
ly by placing a burden upon carriers engaged in commerce
throughout the state or even throughout a number of states. This
is not the place to analyze the cases involving state and municipal
taxes upon interstate commerce. Suffice it to say that, where
cities have -been" given clear legislative authority to levy the taxes
in -question, and where it has been attempted to avoid placing a
direct or serious burden upon, interstate commerce, local taxes
upon railroads, express,companies, telephone companies, and sim-
ilar businesses have usually been upheld. 77
cities concerned had the power of eminent domain beyond their boundaries
are: Cummins v. City of Seymour, (1881) 79 Ind. 491, 41 Am. Rep. 618(drainage ditch); Matter of Mayor, etc., of New York, (1885) 99 N. Y.
569, 2 N. E. 642 (park) ; Matter of Department of Public Parks, (1889)
53 Hun (N.Y.) 280, 6 N. Y. S. 750 (park); Walker v. Cincinnati, (1871)
21 Ohio St. 14 (railroad) ; State ex rel. v. Port of Astoria, (1916) 79 Or.
1, 154 Pac. 399 (port purposes).
76Helm v. City of Grayville, (1906) 224 Ill. 274, 79 N. E. 689.
"TCity of Sacramento v. California Stage Co., (1859) 12 Cal. 134;
City of Los Angeles v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., (1882) 61 Cal. 59;
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Closely allied to these cases are those in which municipalities
have attempted to tax vehicular traffic passing through, or into
and out of the city from adjacent communities. The statutes,
charters, and ordinances involved do not always clearly indicate
whether the main purpose is to obtain a municipal revenue
through licensing, or whether the license is a mere incident to
police regulation. The distinction need not detain us long, how-
ever, for the reason that most of the decisions have turned upon
points of construction of statutes, charters, and ordinances rather
than upon constitutional questions. In an early Massachusetts
case the city of Boston, acting under express power to provide for
the due regulation in the city of omnibuses used wholly or in part
in the city, by prescribing routes or places of standing or in any
other manner whatsoever, prohibited the running of such omni-
buses from Roxbury into Boston except after the purchase of a
license.78 This was held to be a tax and without authority It was
thought that express legislation would be needed to authorize such
a tax, and the evils of control by one city of intermunicipal or
statewide traffic were dwelt upon.
A few years later a Pennsylvania borough, under legislative au-
thority to require all vehicles "using the paved streets of the
borough, to be registered, and a moderate license to be paid for
them," ordained an annual license fee of $2.00 for each dray. By
express provision all "vehicles passing through the borough on
their way to Pittsburgh or elsewhere, on their ordinary business,"
were required to pay, but travelers, and farmers hauling their own
produce to market were specifically excepted. One who owned an
alkali works in an adjacent township refused to pay the license
and was sued in action of debt for the license and the fine.7 9 In
a vigorous, well reasoned decision the court held that the act did
not entitle the borough "to tax any vehicle except those of their
own citizens carrying on some branch of business or occupation
within the town by means of them." The ordinance, on its face,
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. City of Fremont, (1894) 39 Neb. 692
58 N. W 415, City of York v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad
Co., (1898) 56 Neb. 572, 76 N. W 1065; Nebraska Telephone Co. v. City
of Lincoln, (1908) 82 Neb. 59, 117 N. W 284, 28 L. R. A. (N.S.) 221;
Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Charleston, (1894) 153 U. S. 692, 14 Sup.
Ct. 1094, 38 L. Ed. 871. In the case of City of Cairo v. Adams Express
Co., (1894) 54 I11. App. 87, the city was clearly without legislative author-
ity to levy the tax involved, and the question involved in Wilkey v. City
of Pekin, (1857) 19 Ill. 160, was that of the situs for tax purposes of a
vessel engaged in interstate commerce.
78Commonwealth v. Stodder, (1848) 2 Cush. (Mass.) 562.7 9Bennett v. Borough of Birmingham, (1854) 31 Pa. 15.
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included "every man who drives his cart into the town to get a
wheel mended, and every farmer who goes there to get a bar of
iron, a box of glass, or a keg of sugar. And more especially and
plainly it includes all who do not stop in the town, but pass
through it to other places; and if the word 'bringing' be taken
strictly, it includes even farmers carrying their produce to an-
other market."
These two decisions of seventy-five years ago have set the
standard for later ones. With only a few exceptions the courts
have given a strict construction to statutes and charter provisions
authorizing- local vehicle licenses.80  They have thus prevented
municipalities from putting burdens on regularly established in-
termunicipal carriers, on the one hand, and on the other hand they
have denied.that licensing ordinances can be applied to the casual
use of streets by farmers, travelers, and those who make only in-
frequent or occasional use thereof. The business too be licensed
should be strictly or primarily within the city. It should be a
regular business, and not a mere "sporadic act" or an incident of
some other business.
But where a mine operator used sixteen four-horse teams haul-
ig coal, which "must have passed and repassed almost constant-
ly" through the town to a shipping point beyond, a vehicle tax of
$10.00 per year for a four-horse team was held not unreason-
able.81 And such was also the decision where a rolling mill oper-
ator outside the city used drays within the city for daily free de-
livery of his iron products.8 2 In Minnesota, also, a city which was
an important terminal for an inter-city motor 'bus line was held
to have power under its home rule charter to require a license
and a bond of, each bus in operation; but this decision stands upon
unusual grounds, and cannot be harmonized fully with others."3
"SMcDonald v. City of 'Paragould, (1915) 120 Ark. 226, 179 S. W. 335;
Argenta v. Keath, (1917) 130 Ark. 334, 197 S. W 686, L. R. A. 1918B 888;
City of Collinsville v. Cole, (1875) 78 Ill 114; City of East St. .Louis v.
Bux, (1892) 43 Ill. App. 276; City of St. Charles v. Nolle, (1872) 51 Mo.
122, 11 .Am. Rep. 440; Cary v. Mayor, etc., of Borough of North Plain-
field, (1886) 49 N. J: L. 110, 7 At. 42; Pegg v., City of Columbus, (1909)
80 Ohio .St 367, 89 N. E. 14, 23 L. R. A. (N.S.) 453; White Oak Coal Co.
v. City of Manchester, (1909) 109 Va. 749, 64 S. E. 944; Lenox v. George-
town, (1809) Fed. Cas. No. 8,245.8
'Gartside v. City of East St. Louis, (18671 43 Ill. 47.82City of Memphis v. Battaile and Co., (1873) 55 Tenn. (8 Heisk.)
524, 24 Am. Rep. 285.
8S3Jefferson Highway Transportation Co. v. City of St. Cloud, (1923)
155 Minn. 463, 193 N. W. 960. Compare City of Sacramento v. California
Stage Co., (1859) 12 Cal. 134. Non-residence alone is not sufficient
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It should perhaps be repeated, in summary, that none of these
cases decide directly that the legislature is without power to
authorize municipalities to tax the traffic that goes through them.8 4
In most instances they decide that no such power has been given,
or at the most they hold that the ordinance as drawn is unreason-
able. In one instance, however, the Missouri court referred to
Wells v. Weston and asserted that "although there may not be
any express limitation on legislative power in our state constitu-
tion, in many instances the very nature of our state governments
and the purposes for which they were created, must form a barrier
to legislation which deprives one portion of the community of its
property for the benefit of others."' 5
In a second group of cases, arising principally in the southern
states, local occupational taxes are involved and the questions
raised affect mainly the situs for tax purposes of small local busi-
nesses. An occupational tax, it is clear, depends not upon the
residence of the persons engaged in business, but upon the place
where the business is actually carried on. Thus a warehouseman
living in a city but having his warehouse and his entire business
outside and thirty miles away cannot be taxed on this business in
the city ;8 but a banker and a lawyer who reside outside the city
but carry on their businesses or professions within it are tax-
able ;87 and a butcher whose place of business and slaughter house
was one mile outside the city, but who made daily trips in to the
city to sell his meats to regular customers was carrying on his
business within the city to an extent sufficient to bring him under
the city's taxing power.8 " A license tax on wagons used in the
city was also held to apply to one who had a market stall in the
city and who came in daily with a load of meat, although his resi-
dence and slaughter house were outside; 80 and in another case
ground for exemption from local vehicle and business taxes. Mason v.
Mayor, etc., of Cumberland, (1901) 92 Md. 451, 48 Atl. 136; City Council
of Charleston v. Pepper, (1845) 1 Rich. (S.C.) 364.
84There are limits, of course, upon the power to burden interstate
commerce, but we avoid that question.
85City of St. Charles v. Nolle, (1872) 51 Mo. 122, 11 Am. Rep. 440.8GBates v. Mayor, etc., of Mobile, (1871) 46 Ala. 158.87Moore v. Mayor, etc., of Fayetteville (1879) 80 N. C. 154, 30 Am.
Rep. 75, Frommer v. City of Richmond, ?1879) 31 Gratt. (Va.) 646, 31
Am. Rep. 746; City of Petersburgh v. Cocke, (1897) 94 Va. 244, 26 S. E.
576. See also Worth v. Commissioners of Fayetteville, (1864) 60 N. C.
617, and American Manufacturing Co. v. City of St. Louis, (1917) 270
Mo. 40, 192 S. W 402.
S8 Davis and Co. v. Mayor, etc., of Macon, (1879) 64 Ga. 128.
89Frommer v. City of Richmond, (1879) 31 Gratt. (Va.) 646, 31 Am.
Rep. 746.
EXTRATERRITORIAL POWERS OF CITIES
such a tax applied to a non-resident dairyman who sold milk daily
in the city.90
The taxation cases discussed up to this point have been mainly
cases of taxes which could be collected within the city, but of
which, the effects would be felt to a considerable extent outside
the city and by non-residents. We come now to the few cases in
which cities have attempted actually to levy taxes outside of their
boundaries. The courts are unanimous in holding that the power
of a municipality .to levy taxes beyond its boundaries cannot be
implied' 1 For purposes of taxation a municipal boundary is,
therefore, a real limitation. The question still remains, however,
whether the legislature may not constitutionally authorize a city
to levy certain taxes beyond the ordinary city limits-whether, in
other words, such an express legislative act could not be consider-
ed an extension of the municipal area for taxation purposes. In
attempting to answer this question, we may distinguish between
three types of taxes first, ordinary property taxes, second, spe-
cial assessments; and third, licenses taxes upon business in which
some element of the police power is involved.
The preponderance of judicial opinion is undoubtedly against
the power of the city to tax real estate beyond its boundaries. This
point has been directly decided in Missouri 02 and has been as-
serted in many jurisdictions.0 3  The leading iissouri case in-
volved a charter provision which attempted to authorize the city
9°Mason v. Mayor, etc., of Cumberland, (1901) 92 Md. 451, 48 Aft. 136.
In Christie v. Malden, (1884) 23 W Va. 667, the court avoided a decision
on the power of a town to tax a ferry which operated from the opposite
shore to the town and back.91Toby v. Haggerty, (1861) 23 Ark 370; In re House Bill No. 165,(1890) 15 Colo. 595, 26 'Pac. 141; Farris v. Vannier, (1889) 6 Dak. 186, 42
N. W 31, 3 L. R. A. 713; Keokuk and Hamilton Bridge Co. v. People,(1896) 161 Ill. 132, 43 N. E. 691; Ham v. Sawyer, (1854) 38 Me. 37;
Taylor v. Youngs, (1882) 48 Mich. 268, Town of Cameron v. Stephenson,
(1879) 69 Mo. 372; City of Plattsburgh v. Clay, (1896) 67 Mo. App. 497;
Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, (1900) 61 Neb. 75, 84 N. W. 607;
Hemple v. City of Hastings, (1907) 79 Neb. 723, 113 N. W 187; Van Cleve
v. Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners, (1905) 71 N. J. L. 574, 60 At.
214; Gilchrist's Appeal, (1885) 109 Pa. 600; Hubbard v. Newton, (1880)
52 Vt. 346; Pacific Sheet Metal Works v. Roeder, (1901) 26 Wash. 183,
66 Pac. 428.92Wells v. City of Weston, (1856) 22 Mo. 384.93See the decisions from Colorado, Dakota, and New Jersey, cited in
note 91, above and also Malone v. Williams, (1907) 118 Tenn. 390, 419-20,
103 S. W. 798, 121 A. S. R. 1002, but leases, it has been held, may be
taxed were found, Johnson v. Harrison Naval Stores Co. (1914) 108 Miss.
627, 67 So. 147; and-franchises in the-principal place of business of the
company holding them, Board of Councilmen of City of Frankfort v.
Stone. (1900) 108 Ky. 400, 56 S. W 679.
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of Weston to tax property within the city up to one per cent of its
value, and property in a half mile zone outside up to one-half of
one per cent. The extraterritorial tax was held unconstitutional
as not a true tax but an arbitrary taking of property. The court
held that a constitutional prohibition against the "arbitrary taking
of private property for private use without any compensation"
would be implied,0 4 and evidently considered that the extrater-
ritorial tax was not for a public purpose since those who paid it
received no benefit from it. "If the legislature possess the power,
now claimed, over private property," said the court, "they ought
to exercise it themselves, and not delegate it to those whose inter-
est it is to abuse it."
A Virginia statute at a later date authorized a town to levy a
tax to guarantee a six per cent return on $500,000 of stock of a
railroad company, and for this purpose only to levy a tax not only
within the city but also in a zone one-half mile wide around it.
In the litigation over the collection of this tax extraterritorially
it was argued that under the state constitution no persons could
be "taxed or deprived of their property for public uses, without
their own consent or that of their representatives." 95 The court,
holding the tax constitutional, pointed out that it was authorized
and levied by the authority not of the city but of the state legis-
lature. "The tax being thus imposed by the power and authority
of the legislature alone, it follows that it might as well be dele-
gated to local authorities who do not represent the people" as to
any authorities who might have been elected by them. This rea-
soning receives some support in other decisions, 0 but it must be
admitted that in a number of cases the courts have held taxes in-
valid because they violated a supposed constitutional rule against
"taxation without representation." 07 Other considerations which
have had weight with the courts are that persons outside of the
city levying the tax receive no benefits therefrom, although this
would seem to be a question primarily for the legislature, and
that such taxation could not be equal or uniform. In Iowa, as we
94See also Cheaney v. Hooser, (1848) 9 B. Munroe (48 Ky.) 330.
95Langhorne and Scott v. Robinson, (1871) 20 Gratt. (Va.) 661.
OsSee, for example, State ex rel. Bulkeley v. Williams, (1896) 68 Conn.
131, 35 Atl. 24, 421, 48 L. R. A. 465.
97Hundley and Rees v. Commissioners of Lincoln Park, (1873) 67 I1.
559; State ex rel. Howe v. Mayor, etc., of Des Moines, (1897) 103 Iowa
76, 72 N. W 639, 39 L. R. A. 285; 64 A. S. R. 157, Campbell County v.
City of Newport, (1917) 174 Ky. 712, 193 S. W 1, L. R. A. 1917D 791;
State ex rel. Chouteau v. Leffingwell, (1873) 54 Mo. 458.
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have pointed out elsewhere, the doctrine of benefits has been
carried so far as to prohibit cities from taxing agricultural lands
within their recognized boundaries, since such lands would re-
ceive no appreciable benefits from municipal expenditure. s
The special assessment cases follow closely the cases relative to
general property taxes. If an improvement is really local in its
nature, special assessments therefor may be levied upon benefited
property within the city even though the improvement, such as a
drain or sewer outlet, may extend partly outside the city.00 On
the other hand the courts will not imply a power in the city to
levy special assessments outside its limits, and there are dicta
practically to the effect that the legislature cannot authorize such
extraterritorial assessments. 0 0 In the case last cited the court
said:
There is no principle that I am aware of, which sanctions the
doctrine that it is within the taxing power of the legislature to
compel one town, city or locality to contribute to the payment of
the debts of another. The government has no such authority, and
this case is entirely without a precedent. If such assessments
were authorized they might not be limited to adjoining towns,
cities or villages, but applied to those located at great distances
from each other. Such legislation would be unjust, mischievous
and oppressive, and cannot be tolerated."
This statement is a mere dictum, however, since the court de-
cided the case upon other grounds. At the same time it clearly
implied that the legislature itself might have provided for such
extraterritorial assessments. At any rate, in Pennsylvania the
statutes governing third class cities expressly authorize extra-
territorial assessments to a distance of 150 feet beyond the city
to pay for the improvement of boundary streets, and this act has
been sustained in a case which raised some questions concerning
its constitutionality.' 0' To the writer it would seem that such acts
might well be upheld on the grounds, first, that it is the legisla-
ture which authorizes such assessments, and second, that due
9sSee note 13 above, page 479.99Minnesota and M. Land and Improvement Co. v. City of Billings,
(1901) 111 Fed. 972; Shreve v. Town of Cicero, (1889) 129 Ill. 226,
21 N. E. 815; Cochran v. Village.of Park Ridge, (1891) 138 Ill. 295. 27
N. E. 939; Callon v. City of Jacksonville, (1893) 147 Ill. 113, 35 N. E: 223;
Butler v. Town of Montclair, (1902) 67 N. J. L. 426, 51 Atl. 494. But see
Hundley and Rees v. Commissioners of Lincoln Park, (1873) 67 Ill. 559,
and Bloomington Cemetery Association v. People, (1891) 139 II1. 16, 28
N. E. 1076.
'
00Municipality Number One v. Young, (1850) 5 La. Ann. 362;
Matter of Prospect Park in Brooklyn, (1875) 60 N. Y. 398.
'
01Ben Avon Borough v. Crawford, (1916) 64 Pa. Super. Ct. 163.
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process does not reqmre that only the elected representatives of
the taxpayers be empowered to spread the assessments.10 2
The cases which involve municipal taxation of business outside
of the city's boundaries are few, and they are hard to distinguish
from the police power cases where a license is imposed not for
revenue but for purposes of regulation. An Alaska case relative
to a tax by the town of Fairbanks upon cattle and meat kept at a
slaughterhouse outside the town seems to be one in which the
real issue is that of the situs of the cattle and meat for tax pur-
poses.' Some of the meat being brought into the town and sold
there from time to time, a settlement was made with the court's
approval whereby taxes were paid upon this part of the meat but
not upon the rest. In a West Virginia case a license ordinance
covering saloons within one mile of the city was treated as a reve-
nue measure, and the license was held invalid since it was for gen-
eral revenue purposes of the city instead of being for the more
restricted purposes stated in the enabling act.' 0 ' These two deci-
sions give us no clear line of judicial reasoning, but there is little
reason why the courts should view extraterritorial business taxes
and-extraterritorial property taxes as in any way materially differ-
ent. Licensing for police purposes will be dealt with in the fol-
lowing pages.
THE POLICE POWER BEYOND CITY LIMITS
The power to regulate the conduct of persons and their various
uses of land, buildings, and movable things is the essence of the
police power. It is among the two or three most important pow-
ers conferred upon true municipalities, and it stamps the place
which possesses it as a distinct government, though it may be a
subordinate one. The purposes of the local police power, no-
where fully defined, comprise the protection and promotion of the
health, morals, and safety of the people, and also their comfort
and convenience.
There is common agreement that, as a rule, the police power of
a city extends only to the corporate limits of the place. In fact,
the principal purpose of setting municipal boundaries is to set a
territorial limit to the city's governmental powers. Municipal reg-
'
02Daley v. City of St. Paul, (1862) 7 Minn. 390 (Gil. 311).
10 3Town of Fairbanks v. Independent Meat Market, (1910) 4 Alaska
147
10 4Kaufle v. Delaney, (1885) 25 W Va. 410. See also the cases cited
in notes 125 and 128, below.
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ulations are, therefore, felt primarily by the local inhabitants.
Both indirectly and directly, however, a great many city ordin-
ances have an appreciable extraterritorial effect.
Even when a police ordinance is enforced only within city limits
its effects upon those living outside may be very important. Each
day hundreds of people from outside come into small cities for
trading and other purposes, and in the case of large cities the
count of such daily transients runs high into the ten thousands.
This is what rural members of the Massachusetts constitutional
convention of 1820-21 had in mind when they expressed fear of
chartered cities lest they pass ordinances to "ensnare and en-
trap" the people from the neighboring towns who repaired to
them for business, and it was undoubtedly to allay such fears that
the convention wrote into the constitutional amendments a pro-
vision that the by-laws of municipal governments should "be sub-
ject at all times, to be annulled by the general court." 205
It was then already the accepted rule that the by-laws of cities
"should bind strangers," 1°0 and it is, in fact, hard to see how a
municipal corporation could really provide local government over
a place unless this were the law. Nevertheless the question of the
binding effect of local ordinances upon non-residents has fre-
quently been raised, and it has been necessary for the courts to say
over and over again that those coming into a city are bound to
take notice of the regulations there existing, since "a bye-law or
ordinance, which a corporation is authorized to make, it as bind-
ing on its members and all others, as any statute or law of the
Commonwealth." 1 7
105Amendments, art. II.06Cuddon v. Eastwick, (1704) 1, Salkeld 193. The rule in Comyns'
Digest, 3rd ed., 1792, pp. 160-61, that "a corporation, without authority of
parliament, or an express prescription (sic), cannot make a by-law which
shall bind a.stranger" is supported by the citation of the cases of Oxford
university, the corporation of Trinity house, etc., which would not today
be considered municipal corporations, but which attempted to make by-
laws applicable outside their own precincts. Some years before 1792, Lord
Mansfield had held a by-law of Exeter binding upon a stranger within
the city on the ground "that he is an inhabitant pro hac vice, and conse-
quently is bound by the same regulations as the other members of the
corporation are!' Pierce v. Bartrum, (1775) Cowper 269, 270.
"
07Heland v. Lowell, (1862) 3 Allen (Mass.) 407 See also Folmar v.
Curtis, (1888) 86 Ala. 354, 5 So. 678; Mason v. Mayor, etc., of Cumber-
land, (1901 92 Md. 451, 48 Atl. 136; Vandine, Petitioner, (1828) 6 Pick.
(Mass.) 187; Commonwealth v. Plaisted, (1889) 148 Mass. 375, 19 N. E.
224, 2 L. R. A. 142, 12 A. S. R. 456; Bott v. Pratt (1885) 33 Minn. 323. 23
N. W. 237, 53 Am. Rep. 47, Village of Buffalo v. Webster. (1833) 10
Wend. (N.Y.) 100; Kennedy v. Sowden, (1841) 1 McMull. (S.C.) 323
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The same rule applies, of course, to the chattels and other prop-
erty of non-residents brought or allowed to come into the
municipality The most numerous American cases under this
head have involved mumcipal ordinances affecting farmers from
the neighboring countryside. That a municipal ordinance which
provides for the impounding of estrays, and for the sale or de-
struction thereof after published notice, will bind a neighboring
farmer has been settled. 08 "Such regulations would be of little
avail, if restricted in their operation to the stock of the inhabit-
ants." But where, under such an ordinance, the estray has been
impounded and sold, it has been held that the ordinance against
estrays cannot be the basis of a civil action for damages caused
by the estrays while unlawfully at large in the city, for this might
result in giving an almost unlimited extraterritorial effect to such
an ordinance.01
Besides the estray ordinances, there are many for the regula-
tion of local business which affect the farmers in the adjacent
areas. Thus it has been held that local ordinances for the licens-
ing and regulation of vehicles used in the city, of the scavenging
business, and of the sale of meat, milk, and other products within
the city, will apply in full vigor to non-residents.110 At the same
time it is noticeable that the courts, while admitting the principle,
have sometimes softened its effect an practice. Thus, although a
New York court in an early decision held a farmer guilty of vio-
lating a local market ordinance though his offense was only the
exchange of a leg of lamb for a pound of tea;"' and a Minnesota
decision in our own century held guilty of peddling without a
license a farmer who merely peddled a surplus of melons which
he was unable to dispose of at the central market ;"12 a Georgia
decision of 1889 held that a farmer who gathered up wood clear-
ed from his land and hauled the surplus into the city for sale was
not engaged in running a wagon and conducting a business within
'
08Folmar v. Curtis, (1888) 86 Ala. 354, 5 So. 678; State v. Tweedy,(1894) 115 N. C. 704, 20 S. E. 183; Kennedy v. Sowden, (1841) 1 McMull.
(S.C.) 323.
'
0 9Jones v. Hines, (1908) 157 Ala. 624, 47 So. 739, 22 L. R. A. (N.S.)
1098. The city has, of course, no implied power to enact laws relative to
civil remedies in general, whether made applicable to non-residents or not.
"10 Tomlinson v. City of Indianapolis, (1895) 144 Ind. 142. 43 N. E. 9,
36 L. R. A. 413, note; Mason v. Mayor, etc, of Cumberland, (1901) 92
Md. 451, 48 Atl. 136; Pierce v. Bartrum, (1775) Cowper 269; City Council
of Charleston v. Pepper, (1845) 1 Rich. (S.C.) 364.
"'Village of Buffalo v. Webster, (1833) 10 Wend. (N.Y.) 100.
"'2State v. Jensen, (1904) 93 Minn. 88, 100 N. W 644.
EXTRATERRITORIAL POWERS OF CITIES
the city.'1 3 On the other hand, a truck gardener who kept a stand
in the city to which he daily brought his produce for sale was sub-
ject along with others to pay a vehicle tax for the maintenance of
streets.114 Discriminations favorable to non-residents in such
cases, sometimes found, are not disapproved -by the courts, but
those which discriminate against them are looked on with dis-
favor as discriminatory or class legIslation, lacking in equal pro-
tection."15
A group of milk ordinance cases furnish us with a striking
example of how a by-law which is enforced only within city
limits really operates extraterritorially as a regulation of the
dairyman's business. His market is in the city, and if the city
ordinance says to him that he may not sell his milk there unless
his cattle and his barns have been inspected and approved by a
city health officer, he has little choice but to consent. In several
cases where ordinances of this type have been attacked on the
ground that they operate outside the city limits, the courts have
sustained them on the ground that the only subject on which they
operate "is the sale of milk within the city." 11 No fee for in-
spection of cattle and barns may be charged contrary to statute,
but where the ordinance made a charge of only $1.00 for inspec.
hon, it was held not to violate a statute which forbade charging a
"license to vend or sell." 117
13Gunn v. Mayor, etc., of Macon, (1889) 84 Ga. 365, 10 S. E. 972.
2Z4See first two.cases in note 110, above.
1iTomlinson v. City of Indianapolis, (1895) 144 Ind. 142 43 N. E. 9,
36 L. R. A. 413; McRoberts v. City of Sullivan, (1896) 67 Ifl. App. 435;
City of Carrollton v. Bazzette, (1896) 159 Ill. 284, 42 N. E. 837, 31 L. R. A.
522; State ex reL. Greenwood v. Nolan, (1909) 108 Minn. 170, 122 N. W.
255; State ex rel. Mudeking v. Parr, (1909) 109 Minn. 147, 123 N. W. 408;
People v. Jarvis, (1897) 19 App. Div. 466, 46 N. Y. S. 596; Borough of
Sayre v. Phillips, (1892) 148 Pa. 482, 24 At. 76, 33 A. S. R. 842, 16 L. R. A.
49, and note. In Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota, Ohio, and Virginia, and
probably in other states, legislation has been enacted exempting from
certain peddlers' licensing ordinances those who sell only the produce
raised by themselves. The cases of Gass and Vestal v. Corporation of
Greenwich, (1856) 4 Sneed (Tenn.) 62, and City of Lamar v. Weidman,
(1894) 57 Mo. App. 507, decided that public weighing ordinances would
not apply to those who brought hay, etc, into the city, but did not offer
to sell it there.I-State v. Nelson, (1896) 66 Minn. 166, 68 N. W. 1066, 61 A. S. .
399, 34 L. ,. A. 318; City of Norfolk v. Flynn, (1903) 101 Va. 473, 44 S. E.
717, 99 A. S. R. 918, 62 L. R. A. 771. But where the ordinance merely
forbade the sale within the city of adulterated milk, it would not apply
to a sale outside of the city even though the milk was to be shipped into
the city for use. McKeesport v. Mayhugh, (1904) 14 Pa. Dist. 224.
117City of St Paul v. Peck, (1900) 78 Minn. 497, 81 N. W 389; State
v. Elofson, (1902) 86 Minn. 103, 90 N. W 309; Walton v. City of Toledo,(1902) 3 Ohio C. C. (N. S.) 295, aff'd in 69 Ohio St. 548, 70 N. E. 1134.
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We come next to a group of cases in which cities have at-
tempted to regulate what we may call, for want of a better term,
intermunicipal highway traffic. Here again we have a case where
the regulation itself may impinge upon the subject only within
the city limits, but where the regulation has a direct effect on
businesses which m;1y extend far beyond the city In the case of
Commonwealth v. Stodder, already discussed,"1 8 the city of Bos-
ton had power to regulate omnibuses used wholly or in part within
the city, either by prescribing routes or stopping places or in any
other manner whatsoever Under this power the city endeavored
to license and to regulate an inter-city omnibus line. The decision
went against it largely because of the license imposed, but the
court thought that even if the license had been so reduced that it
would have ceased to be a tax, it would still have been "an un-
necessary restraint upon the business of those carrying pas-
sengers for hire, and not binding upon inhabitants of other
towns." The requirements of the ordinance as to routes to be
followed were fully sustained, however, as proper police regula-
tions and fully authorized by the statute.
Similar conclusions have been reached in other cases. The
Borough of Gettysburgh, Pennsylvania, was held to be without
the power to regulate the rates of liverymen for taking passen-
gers beyond the borough limits to visit the national cemetery and
battlefield, 11 an Ohio city which had authority "to regulate the
speed of interurban traction and street railway cars within the
corporation" was held to have acted unreasonably in ordaining
that interurban cars should stop at any street intersection in the
city on signal, 120 and a California city was denied the power to
stipulate in a street railway franchise as to the rate of fare to be
charged to the neighboring city of Los Angeles and return.lzi
An Arkansas ferry decision reaches a different conclusion.1 21
The city, which had the power to regulate ferries within its limits,
enforced its ordinance for the licensing and regulation of ferries
upon one whose ferry operated from a landing in the city across
a navigable river which lay outside of the city to a point on the
128(1848) 2 Cush. (Mass.) 562. See note 78 above.
"
0aBorough of Gettysburgh v. Zeigler, (1886) 2 Pa. Co. Ct. 326.
12OTowvnsend v. City of Circleville, (1908) 78 Ohio St. 122, 84 N. E.
792.
1l2City of South Pasadena v. Los Angeles Terminal Ry. Co., (1895)
109 Cal. 315, 41 Pac. 1093.l2Arkadelphia Lumber Co. v. Arkadelphia, (1892) 56 Ark. 350, 19
S. W 1053.
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other side. The ferry owner claimed exemption, but his claim
was rejected -by the court for the reason that the legislature had
clearly iiitended to give the city the power to regulate ferries, and
.that under the circumstances "the right to regulate would be of
no service to the city unless it also has the right to regulate ferries
bperated from the opposite bank." This case did not involve the
regulation of rates, but on that point the law has hit upon a com-
promise apparently peculiar to the law of ferries, namely that
where a ferry operates between cities, each will have power to
regulate the ferriage for passengers from its own area to the op-
'posite shore.'23 It is obvious in the case of ferries between cities
that a rate operating wholly and exclusively within the city would
be an absurdity. Ferry passengers cannot get off in midstream to
finish the journey on foot, and the collection of two fares would
be an awkward thing as a rule.
The decisions relating to the police power of cities over inter-
municipal carriers should be read in connection with the taxation
cases on the same subject, since the line between them is some-
times hard to draw. 2 4 Of course, no one now seriously questions,
and we have not essayed to discuss, the rule that municipal corp-
-orations may make reasonable regulations as to the speed and
afety of trains operated on railroads within city limits. It is
when the regulation takes the form of licensing, and thus tends
to move off in the direction of taxation, that the courts begin to
eye the regulations most critically.
Up to this point we have mentioned only *those police power
'cases in which the municipal regulation, though enforced solely
within the city, had an extraterritorial effect. A distinct group
'of decisions consists of those -in which the local ordinance power
has been extended, by statute or charter, for one or more pur-
poses, to a distance of one-half, one, two, or even more miles
beyond the ordinary city limits. In such cases we may look upon
the extension of power as either an extension of municipal
boundaries for one or more purposes, or as a legislative act giv-
ing a limited extraterritorial effect to a municipal regulation, or as
a direct conferment of extraterritorial power upon the city.
There are a number of cases in which charters and laws have
extended the municipal police power to license, regulate, or pro-
"2sCity of Bellaire ex rel. Sedgwick v. Bellaire, etc., Ferry Co., (1922)
105 Ohio St. 247, 136 N. E. 899, and cases cited.
"24See cases cited above in notes 78 to 85, inclusive.
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hibit the liquor traffic beyond city limits for a distance of from
one-half mile to as much as five miles."15 In regulating and pro-
hibiting this traffic under local option laws, cities could hardly
have made their regulations effective if dram-shops could be set
up with impunity a few feet beyond the city's limits. To remedy
this situation a number of states provided that no saloon could
be operated within' a zone of fixed width around; a city without
the license or consent of the municipality In whatever form they
appeared, such provisions amounted in effect to an extension of
city's boundaries for this purpose. They were attacked, as a
matter of course, in a number of jurisdictions, sometimes on the
ground that they denied equal protection of the laws, sometimes
for the more uncertain reason that they gave officials elected by
one electorate the power to enact ordinances binding outsiders
who had no right to vote for these officaals. Despite such at-
tacks, however, the courts were almost unanimous in sustaining
such acts, although in some cases they construed them with a
great deal of strictness. 12 6 The legislature, said one court, had
power "to determine over what territory the jurisdiction of a
mumcipal corporation shall extend." 121 It has in some cases been
stated or inferred that if the legislature has the power to extend
a city's boundaries for all purposes, it may do so for one or a few
purposes. Legally this view is probably correct, but it overlooks
the political fact that, when a city's boundaries are extended for
general purposes, the qualified voters in the annexed territory
become voters of the enlarged municipality, whereas they have no
such right when a city exercises one or more powers over them
extraterritorially
Analogous cases are to be found in the matters of the regulation
or prohibition within a fixed distance of the city -of slaughter-
125People v. Raims, (1895) 20 Colo. 489, 39 Pac. 341; Strauss v. Town
of Pontiac, (1866) 40 Ill. 301, Lutz v. City of Crawfordsville, (1886) 109
Ind. 466,10 N. E. 411; Emerich v. City of Indianapolis, (1888) 118 Ind. 279,
20 N. E. 795; Jordan v. City of Evansville, (1904) 163 Ind. 512, 72 N. E.
544, 67 L. R. A. 613; State v. Shroeder, (1879) 51 Iowa 197, 1 N. W. 431;
Town of Centerville v. Miller, (1879) 51 Iowa 712, 2 N. W 527; Town of
Toledo v. Edens, (1882) 59 Iowa 352, 13 N. W 313; City of Albia v.
O'Harra, (1884) 64 Iowa 297, 20 N. W 444, Board of Trustees of Fal-
mouth v. Watson, (1869) 5 Bush. (Ky.) 660; State ex rel. Miller v.
Carver, (1914) 126 Minn. 5, 147 N. W 660; Inhabitants of Town of
Fredericktown v. Fox, (1884) 84 Mo. 59; Town of Gower v. Agee,(1908) 128 Mo. App. 427, 107 S. W 999; Bailey v. Raleigh (1902) 130
N. C. 209, 41 S. E. 281, 58 L. R. A 1782GStrauss v. Town of Pontiac, (1866) 40 Ill. 301, State ex rel. Miller
v. Carver, (1914) 126 Minn. 5, 147 N. W 660.
127Emerich v. City of Indianapolis, (1888) 118 Ind. 279, 20 N.E. 795.
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houses, hog farms, and nuisances dangerous to the health and
safety of the people in the city.2'2 This sort of "zoning" by the
state legislature or under its authority is no doubt based upon the
police power of the state, and is justified 'by the necessity of pro-
tecting the preponderant interests of large populations against
nuisances and noxious or dangerous businesses in adjacent areas.
Such things may be tolerable when at a distance from any con-
siderable population, but become dangerous or deleterious when
placed in close proximity to populous communities.'-
When carefully limited in scope, such express extensions of
municipal police powers have generally been sustained. There
are cases, however, in which the legislatures have made such
sweeping enlargements of municipal authority over adjacent
areas that the courts have hesitated to sustain them. A striking
case is that of the commission government charter enacted for
Memphis in 1907.130 Under this act the city commission, ap-
pointed by the governor, was to have broad powers over quaran-
tine, health and cleanliness, nuisances and buildings, within ten
miles of the city, and within a two mile zone about the city it was
to have and to exercise "all governmental powers and police
powers." The council could even have prohibited pig pens, cow
3S2Boyd v. City Council of Montgomery, (1898) 117 Ala. 677, 23 So.
663 (slaughter-house); Chicago Packing and Provision Co. v. City of
Chicago, (1878) 88 Ill. 221, 30 Am. Rep. 545 (slaughter-house) ; State v.
Franklin, (1888) 40 Kan. 410, 19 Pac. 801 (no implied power to regulate
stock yards beyond city limits); Robb v. City of Indianapolis, (1871) 38
Ind. 49 (disorderly houses, might be suppressed as nuisances); State v.
Rice, (1912) 158 N. C. 635, 74 S. E. 582, 39 L. R. A. (N.S) 266 (hog farm
within one mile); Green v. Mayor, etc., of Savannah, (1849) 6 Ga. 1 (rice
farm.within one mile of city), Van Hook v. City of Selma, (1881) 70 Ala.
361, 45 Am. Rep. 85 (regulating and licensing, as a police measure, the sale
of goods, wares, etc., within police jurisdiction, but outside of city). See
also Harrison v. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore, (1843) 1 Gill (Md.) 264 (gen-
eral health regulations within three miles).
229The storage of explosives and the maintenance of cemeteries, would
seem to come within the rules as to saloons, slaughterhouses, and stock
yards; but of course the power to regulate or prohibit outside city limits
cannot be implied. Gutowski v. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore, (1916) 127 Md.
502, 96 Atl. 630 (handling of explosives) ; City of Duluth v. Orr, (1911)
115 Minn. 267, 132 N. W. 265 (that a home rule city empowered to make
a charter "for its own government as a city" may not forbid storage of
explosives within half mile zone outside of city, although previous legis-
lative charter has given this power); Bogert v. City of Indianapolis,
(1859) 13 Ind. 134 (regulate cemeteries); Begein v. City of Anderson,
1867) 28 Ind. 79-(regulate location of cemeteries) ; Ex parte Deane (1816)
2 Cranch C. C. 125, Fed Cas. No. 3,712 (regulation forbidding nightly
meetings of slaves outside town); City of Topeka v. Cook, 19 72
Kan. 595, 84 Pac. 376 (nuisance in street).
'
30Malone v. Williams, (1907) 118 Tenn. 390, 103 S. AV. 798, 121
A. S. R. 1002.
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stables, and dairies for a distance of ten miles about the city
Other details need not be given here, but the court found the act
so objectionable to constitutional guarantees in various ways that
it held it to be unconstitutional as a whole. Upon the subject of
extraterritorial powers the court, after reviewing certain deci-
sions, remarked
"We have seen that, ex necessitate, a limited police power may
be granted to municipalities over a small section of country sur-
rounding their boundaries for their protection against nuisances,
and to safeguard the health of the people residing in them; but
even this is hard to justify on any principle other than that the
municipality is in such matters the agent of the state itself for
the protection of the people of the state. But that agency cannot
be used as a basis for conferring power upon municipalities over
territory outside of them any further than bare necessity re-
quires." 131
The boundaries of the city set down in its charter may then
be saAd to define the terntorial limits of its agency as a govern-
mental agent of the state. It is perhaps for this reason that the
courts are united in refusing to imply any power on the part of
cities to exercise police powers beyond their limits. 132 It is obvi-
ous that such power could not be implied without getting the
courts into serious difficulties in trying to define the extent of the
powers inferred. Should they extend for one mile, or two miles,
or over the entire county, or even farther? The safest course and
the only proper one for the courts is to construe a city's police
powers to be limited to its ordinary area unless the charter or
laws clearly provide otherwise. Even the powers expressly grant-
ed to a city over adjacent areas are to be construed strictly so as
to prevent cities from doing what the legislature has not author-
ized. Thus a power "to direct the location of markets or slaugh-
terhouses" for two miles beyond the city is not a power to pro-
hibit such establishments in this entire zone.133
But is there not a violation of constitutional rights when the
elected officers of one community are given powers of govern-
ment, however limited, over persons who dwell in other places
and who do not voluntarily come into the place to submit to its
rule? If the doctrine of an "inherent right of local self-govern-
"'1See Blair v. State, (1892) 90 Ga. 326, 17 S. E. 96, 35 A. S. R. 206,
for another attempt to make a general extension of municipal police
jurisdiction.
132See cases cited in note 129, above.
13 3Elkhart v. Lipschitz, (1905) 164 Ind. 671, 74 N. E. 528.
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ment" had not been so generally rejected by the courts it might
have given some support to this view."' In an interesting In-
diana case it was argued that extraterritorial police powers could
not constitutionally be granted to'a city on the ground that "all
government is by the consent of the governed, and that as persons
residing beyond the limits of the city have no voice in the selec-
tion of the officers of the city, or in making by-laws or ordinances,
the common council possesses no jurisdiction over them, and can-
not prescribe what shall .constitute an offence against the author-
ity of the city, for an act committed beyond and outside of the
corporate limits." '35 The court did not pass directly on this prop-
osition, but its dissent may be implied from the fact that both
then and at a later date the court sustained acts conferring ex-
traterritorial police powers. 13 If we bear in mind, also, that the
city acts in governmental matters only as the agent of the state,
and that it has no power to act governmentally either within or
without its ordinary boundaries without state legislative authoriza-
tion, we can properly argue that the act is, however indirectly,
the act of the state legislature, in which all residents of the state
have representation. If the consent of the governed is a pre-
requisite to a valid act of legislation, that consent has been given
by the voters? representatives in the legislature.'3 7
We cannot close this discussion of the police power cases with-
out referring to recent developments in the field of city planning.
Under state laws and charter provisions a number of cities al-
ready have the power to control the layout of streets and the plat-
ting of lands adjacent to the city for distances up to three miles
or more beyond the city limits. "
CONCLUSION
No simple summary of the subject-matter of this article can be
made in a few paragraphs. The main purpose has been to show
by the actual citation of cases that there is a very extensive prac-
1340n this doctrine see H. L. McBain, The Doctrine of an Inherent
Right of Local Self-Government, 16 Col. L. Rev. 190. 299.
135Robb v. City of Indianapolis, (1871) 38 Ind. 49.
136See Indiana cases cited in note 125, above.
37Langhorne and Scott v. Robinson, (1871) 20 Gratt. (Va.) 661; State
ex rel. Bulkeley v. Williams, (1896) 68 Conn. 131, 35 Ad. 24, 48 L. R. A.
465.
13sMinneapolis Charter 1920, ch. viii, secs. 21-23, originally enacted as
Minn. Sp. Laws 1881, ch. 76, sub-ch. 8, secs. 22-24, Pa. P L. 752, Act of
July 16, 1913, in The Third Class City Law, 1921, p. 234; Laws of Ohio,
1923, vol. 110, p. 310, Gen. Code secs. 4366-13 to 4366-19.
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tice, both past and present, to support the thesis that municipal
areas are the centers rather than the limits of municipal activity.
The number and the variety of things which cities can do and are
doing outside of city limits are very impressive and the mass ef-
fect of the presentation would have been even more effective if
space had been taken to cite the numerous statutes and charter
provisions which confer extraterritorial powers. The general im-
pression made, upon the writer's mind, at least, by the many illus-
trations of boundaries broken or overstepped by corporate pur-
poses is that, after all, municipal boundaries are rather hazy, un-
certain, and elastic things. The sharply drawn lines which we
see on city maps are in some degree deceptive.
Two words may, however, be added in conclusion. First, as to
corporate and business powers, it would seem that there is little
reason why the courts should not be liberal toward the cities when
interpreting common law and statutory principles concerning
municipal business activities and property ownership outside city
limits. In origin municipal and private corporations were practi-
cally one. The present distinctions between them have been a
late development. 139 Since private corporations are permitted to
acquire property and carry on their businesses almost anywhere
in the state which creates them, municipal corporations, as to their
private or corporate affairs, may well be accorded substantially
the same privileges for all proper municipal purposes. No serious
wrong to anyone can result from a liberal attitude in such mat-
ters, at least none that cannot easily be righted by the legislature.
As to governmental powers, while the courts have in general
been liberal, a few courts seem to have overlooked the important
fact that municipal corporations exercise these powers only as
agents of the state for and on behalf of the state. The municipal-
ity is, in other words, merely the creature and the instrument of
the state for governmental purposes. The state itself is the chief
reservoir of governmental powers; it has all powers of govern-
ment not conferred upon the national government or denied to the
state by the federal constitution. While the state legislature is fur-
ther restricted by the state constitution, it is nevertheless the chief
repository of the state's powers, and its acts should not lightly be
set aside. If these principles be kept firmly in mind, it will be dif-
139See The History of the Law of Business Corporations before 1800,
by Samuel Williston, in 3 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History,
195-235, and the following essay in the same volume by Simeon E. Baldwin.
EXTRATERRITORIAL POWERS OF CITIES 583
ficult indeed to find much justification for some of the judicial leg-
islation which asserts as constitutional principles, although they
are not put into the constitution, that there can be in local gov-
ernment "no taxation without representation," no taxation of
those who are not directly benefited, no denial of the supposed
inherent right of local self-government, and so on. Specific and
substantial constitutional guarantees should and must be enforced,
but where such cannot be found, decisions relative to local matters
such as municipal powers and boundaries, can well be entrusted
to the legislature and its local agencies, the municipalities them-
selves.
